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•ABSTRACT
N items have been tested . Attempts are made to correct those failure
modes that occur; the probabilities that these attempts are successful are
assumed known . The conditional distribution of the resulting true reliability
is derived and used to construct observable limits which will include the true
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CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TRUE RELIABILITY
AFTER CORRECTIVE ACTION
1. Introduction
This paper considers a situation in which N items of a particular sort
are tested . N of these items work correctly and N-N fail . The items
o o
that fail are scrutinized and for some (or all) the cause of failure is deter-
mined. Corrective action then is taken to remove those failure modes
that are observed in the N tests. The corrective actions taken may or
may not be successful (in removing their respective failure modes from
subsequent items); no further items of a corrected design are tested. It ':' . •'. .'•:







The value of the true reliability of a system after attempts have been -..
'
/
made to remove the failure modes that occur in N independent tests of
/ .>
the system is a quantity of vital interest. This true reliability is, of
course, a random variable, a quantity whose value depends upon the out-
come of a chance experiment. Since no tests of the system are assumed -^Jr,
to have been made after the correctional attempts, there is available no
direct experimental evidence on the reliability value finally attained . How-
ever, assuming we have available the results of the N tests of the system
: i .
*&
and that we know the probability that any occurring failure mode is corrected,' '•"..*'
it is possible to construct the (conditional) distribution of the true relia- .
,
,
bility, and to explore this distribution for possible meaningful statements ;[•••'
•
that can be- made
.
The paper "Estimating Reliability After Corrective Action" defines pO :.,.-.
as a measure of current reliability and then goes on to discuss and compare; . ..' :..;
*
estimators of the average value of p , called the mean reliability. It is
stressed by the authors that the paper is concerned with estimators whose
properties are to be studied prior to the N tests having been performed,
thus justifying the concern about mean reliability, an average taken over
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undoubtedly of interest in the early phases of development of particular
types of item.
It would seem that an equally important problem can be phrased in a
rather different way. Since the final estimator of achieved reliability
(subsequent to the corrective action) is reasonably a function of the number
of failures of various sorts that occur in the N tests, the conditional
distribution of true reliability (conditional upon the outcome of the N
,
tests) might be expected to yield some valuable information. This condi- 4
tional distribution is exactly known (in some senses) at the time the actual
estimator of achieved reliability is to be evaluated . This paper gives the
conditional distribution of true reliability
.
This conditional distribution of true reliability can be used to con-
l
struct a conditional confidence interval for the achieved true reliability,
based upon the results of the N tests. This conditional confidence
interval gives a number, call it Z , such that the probability is at least .'..
1 —or that the true reliability is as large as Z (or larger) . As such, it
reflects both the information contained in the results of the N tests and
'
- the assumed knowledge regarding ability to correct observed failure modes
.
As will be seen, the conditional confidence interval statements that
are given involve some generally described functions. It is expected, but.
not yet investigated, that for some very special types of these functions
relatively tight probability statements can be made. That is, by adjusting
the functions involved, it seems probable that the probability of exceeding
Z might be made quite close to 1 -or, rather than possibly being quite a \ •
bit larger than 1 - a
.
2. Conditional distribution of true reliability .
N systems are to be tested. Each system either operates successfully
(with probability p ) or it fails to operate successfully (with probability
1-p ) . A system which does not 6perat.e successfully can fail according
to anyone of K different modes (with probabilities of occurrence equal
'
.








, i-1 , 2 , . . . , K ) .




In writing the conditional distribution of true reliability , we can choose
to represent either all K possible failure modes or to represent only those
R modes that actually occur. If we make the first of these two choices
,
then in the N system tests we may not observe all K modes . Letting a. \'- .'
be the known probability of correcting the i failure mode, i=l, 2, . . ,,K, ,
'
.it'.i'
the probability mass function of Z, the true reliability, is as given in . y
th -































































































• 1 f i- y. ..,
> ;
!




















































This probability mass function is a little unusual in that we are assuming
we do not know the values the time reliability takes on, since they are
functions of p and the q.'s but we do know the probabilities with
o i
Which these unknown values occur.
We can easily derive the moment generating function for this distri-
bution by examining the terms we get in expanding such a function as
W (a 2 + b2» "• (ak + bk) -






• this sum contains all the terms (and no others) in the expansion of
i=l > 1 i •, i s .
Thus, the moment generating- function for Z (in this formulation) is
K
*z
w " et\;'(axe«iV:aV{ )" 1-1 1 I . ,•*
Evaluating 4 (0) and f_(0) we find
Z «
K :
m = p +X-Viqi = po '
i=l
K
E [(z-E(25 ?] = Z ai (1-a i) xiq i
2
i=l
(Both of these expectations are conditioned upon the results of the N
tests) . Thus', the measure of true reliability (p ) mentioned in the paper
by Corcoran, Weingarten and Zehna is in fact the mean value of the




over all possible experimental outcomes, we arrive at mean reliability,
the quantity they were estimating . Especially since the actual estimation
takes place only after the N tests have been performed, it would seem
*
reasonable to try to estimate p (or some other property of the conditional
distribution) rather than something influenced by events that are known not
to have occurred, when the estimation actually takes place. The second,
simpler (and more natural) representation of the conditional distribution of
true reliability is given by considering only those failure modes that
actually occur in the N system tests (rather than considering all possible
failure modes that could occur) , Let Z be the true reliability (after the
N tests and corrective action) and assume that R failure modes occur.
Then the conditional probability mass function for Z is as given in table
one above, where we set x = 1, for i=l, 2, . . ., R, and set x. = 0, for
i= RtI
, * » • i K
•





o 5 .r«.>i> (i-a.) \ i'•.."':
The mean and variance of Z are








;*-"•. We would like to know the actual value that the true reliability has
taken on, after the corrective action has been completed; this value is



































































:the actual value cannot be observed, the natural substitute to turn to is
estimation of various properties of the conditional distribution of Z
.
'
The question of point estimation in general will be addressed first and
then the idea of interval estimation of Z will be investigated
.
3 . Point Estimation
I •
The most frequently estimated parameter of a probability distribution \
is undoubtedly its mean. Accordingly, if we were to make a point esti- .
'
;
mate of some property of the conditional distribution of Z, the most
logical candidate to consider first might be the mean of the distribution
.
We have available the results of the N system tests for making such an ; .
•v
estimate and thus could consider any estimator which is a function of
N ,N1/ N ;'ND . The estimator \ '-v-;- ::-"'.!;
,"
'






is in fact an unbiased estimate of p , averaging over all possible out-
o
comes of the experiment. However, since we are committed here to con-
sidering only properties of the conditional distribution of Z , it would
be no more than reasonable to consider the properties of estimators
averaging only over those experimental outcomes such that the distri-
bution of Z remains unchanged . If we do not take only such conditional




change so may the quantity to be estimated and we are effectively esti-
mating something different from what was intended . The conditional
'...' s ..
distribution of Z remains unchanged so long as the failure modes
observed are unchanged, no matter how many times they are observed.








to defining the eventA(on the space of all possible outcomes in the N
system tests) to be the set of outcomes such that N >0 , N >0 , . .
.
, N > ,12 R
where failure modes. 1, 2 . .
.
, R are the ones that are observed in the tests
.




properties of point estimators we shall make use of conditional expecta- '
...,; <.'. ;>&










p, = o + ) a.N.





! is an unconditionally unbiased estimator of p (since E(N J ) = NqJ . How-
o i i ..",'>•'
ever, it is not a conditionally unbiased estimator, as will be shown below.
. <
For simplicity, suppose that we perform N system tests and observe "•'.' 'V V.
only 2 failure modes . Define . '../•
A={(N /N., NJ: N.>0, N9 >0[ . -
.,1 O 12 . 1 . Li
.











.and then i;. /* ..; \ . ', •'".- .' '•-./•:'v-< \v
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Without a great deal of difficulty we find (again k= N-i-j)
N-2 N-l-i N
e(n,|a>(a) = £ I i0lOpM««ak .
. ,
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.,.•_ . . ..,,,•
It would appear to be a hopelessly complex job to add a quantity to p.
to correct for its bias (in estimating p conditionally); possibly it could ; , .
not be done. Since conditional unbiasedness seemed so difficult to
'
•
achieve, the investigation of point estimators has initially stopped at

' /
this point. More thought should be given to what parameters of the
conditional distribution are of particular interest before much of an
attempt is made to construct "good" estimators of them. In passing , in




R P R R-l R , ~ j •
E
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| A >(a) = Nq, (i - I (po+ ^)N
-X
+ V • l( Po+ £ q ^ ,:.
rn=r j=1 n=mSl m=l j=1 ...
mA j*n E&1 ' j^m '>;<;;/;
j/n- .;*-








./ These values can (possibly) most easily be derived by taking derivatives





'resulting system of equations for the conditional expectations of interest. ' ^v"
.'•'•.
•/ » , ' •
;








, •••<• ' '
An apparently more fruitful avenue of investigation is that of interval ; ;V....




bution of Z it should be easy in theory to find a point b such that \ . s-
J < •
P (Z> b) ^ 1-cY








interval for Z . The reason that we cannot immediately find the value b, /: ,
'
of course, is we do not in general know p ' q, , . .
. , q T, and thus do .. :,'.'•-
o 1 K









of reasoning that can be explored, leading almost to confidence intervals
for Z (one approach leads exactly to confidence intervals of the above ', .-".'
sort)
. We shall consider two separate cases, the first assuming no ,)''<
.
. :.
information whatsoever about p '/q. , . .
. , q and the second, assuming
h •

that we have available a ranking in order of magnitude of q , q 9 , . . . q ,
determined independently from the current set of tests . Within each of
these we shall discuss both conditional and unconditional confidence
j
intervals for Z .
In the event that p , q, , q . . . , q_ are completely unknown , the
o'
n
l' "2 •"' "R i
.•
values and ranking of values that the true reliability takes on are unknown. .";
However, due to the definition of the probabilities of successes and
failures occurring there is a natural partial ordering that can be exploited ' .
to construct conditional interval statements about Z . Thus, since ..--''.
































+V ••• + qR,
.. and so on . In fact, it can be shown that the true reliability Z may take
R
, on any of 2 (conceivably) distinct values if R failure modes occur.-
p + q. will precede 2 -1 of these, for all i, and is indeterminate with
R-l r ' : ;













v\ ! " ..::> :>• .: ••
remaining (2-1) (2-1) values.
.
This natural partial ordering can be used to make statements such
as k • ' •
.












It if should happen that one of these right hand sides is equal to
a confidence level of interest, then we almost have a confidence interval . : •-.






Almost, because we still do not know p and the q.*s and thus would have
to estimate them in order to have some idea where the minimum value in-
volved might fall . But in making use of such an estimate we would no
longer have an exact probability statement about the interval containing Z •
However, if we think of the compound experiment consisting of the N
system tests and then the corrective action, the reasonable probability
measure to use for the compound experiment is constructed by multiplying
together the measure that applied to the N system tests, times the conditional
measure applicable to the corrective action taken (conditional only in the sense
that the experimental outcome dtermines the corrective action to be taken)
.
Using this multiplicative rule enables us to make statements such as
>Tt WBWWWWWW * 'vrviT"*
I.'"**"' .P|_min (P +Qr ..., P +q^>f(N ,N1# ..wN^.,Zimln(p +q|.^.,p +q M-jj ••'
:
\ m p [min (pQ+q1 ,'..., pQ+q^ , > f(NQ , . . . , N^ | aV












where A is the event defined above . The results of the N system tests
-
are available to evaluate f (N , N. , • .
.
, Nn ) occurring in the first of these
* \
o 1 R . v .
$'-.






statement) while reasoning such as the preceding may be used to evaluate
the second. Their product gives us a statement that is somewhat similar
to a conditional confidence interval; this product can be used to construct
.i
a lower bound confidence interval as follows . Let g be a function of the
unknown parameters, let f be a function of the observable random variables *•
•
N , N, , . .
.
, N_ , and let A be the event that N. > , N- > , . .
.
, NL >0 .
o . i k l z R ".•„\-

















The statement we are able to make is
P (Z>g, g>f | A) = P (Z->g | A) P (g>f |a|
= 1 -a
Since the set relationship { Z >,g, g> £ } c { Z>f } must hold, we can
say
P(Z>f|A)^p(Z>g,g>f|A) and thus get a lower bound
on the probability that an observable interval contains Z .
v"
Unconditional confidence intervals would possibly not be of much
interest, for many of the same reasons given previously regarding expecta-
tions averaged over all possible experimental outcomes . Since we would
not be constructing the interval, presumably , until after the N. system
tests are completed, we would be more interested in the conditional • v
measure of Z than we would be in the unconditional measure. Even if we
had the interest, it would appear to be impossible to construct an uncondi-
tional confidence interval for Z , since the probability that Z exceeds






is going to depend upon what values of the form p , p +q. , p +q 9 , etc.,
are exceeded by f; given no information about p , q, , . . ., qn , we areol R '
not able to determine which of these values are and which are not exceeded
by f . Thus we cannot logically derive an unconditional measure of the '
probability that Z exceeds f. , ; . ; \ \<




















etc.; in general, p +q is indeterminate with respect to 2 " -(R-i)-l of
o i
the othf / values, for 1=1,2, .../R-l. The position of p +q^ is completely :
12

determined with respect to all the possible values . Similarly, we find




- (R-3) -1 values
, p +q.+q~ is ^indeterminate with respect
to 2 - TRo 4 ) " (R~4) "1 values, and so on. The assumed ranking of
the q 's thus leads to a more definite ranking of the values of Z , which ;
in turn would imply that we have a much wider choice of values for state--
ments such as
P ( Z > g | A ) ,
where g is some function of the unknown parameters . Thus we could
construct confidence intervals for a much larger choice of probabilities .
Exactly the same type of reasoning as that outlined above would lead to
lower bounds, on the conditional probabilities that particular intervals
cover Z
.
Unconditional statements would appear as impossible of attain-
ment here as in the preceding case, for exactly the same sort of reasons
.
5 . Topics for further'research .
The conditional multinomial probability statement mentioned in section
4 above may or may not be a simple matter to derive. The feasibility and
explicit method of attaining such a statement should be spelled out in
detail
.
The assumption that the a *s are known (the probabilities of removing
observed failure modes) may not be realistic. The affects of these quanti-
ties being unknown should be detailed. In many cases it would seem
plausible to assume p ,q , . . . ,q known and a , a , . . . ,a unknown; theO 1 K 1 i> K.
affects of this change should be investigated
.
It might prove profitable to replace the probabilities of correcting
observed failure modes by the reliability of the replacement part (or design
change) . That is, if a design change is made then a is essentially the


















that the reliability is less than 1 (but no indication of how much less
than 1) . Rather than include the parameters a in the model it might
prbve better to use the parameters b , defined to be the reliability
of the changed item or portion of the design. This would, of course/
,
allow final reliability after corrective action to decrease rather than only
' to increase as in the present model.
The whole basic model for reliability growth might be better if
.
'.' structured in some different manner. The suggestion made in the last
paragraph is one possible restructuring; undoubtedly many others could
','•' be brought to mind. The restructuring should keep in mind simplicity of
.
.
' • ' ;
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